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TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS IN WASHINGTON
Although parents have natural' and constitutional2 rights to
custody of their offspring, the state may intervene to protect
abused or neglected children.3 A common form of state interven-
tion is a court order declaring the child "dependent."I Courts may
order a dependent child removed from the home and placed in
institutional or foster care,5 but the parents' legal relationship
with the child continues. If home conditions preclude the child's
return, and the parents refuse to terminate their legal relation-
ship, the child may remain in foster care until reaching majority.,
Only court ordered termination of parental rights will allow the
child to move into a permanent adoptive home.
Prior to 1978, Washington allowed trial judges broad discre-
tion to decide, on a case by case basis, the necessity of termina-
ting parental rights.7 The recently adopted Juvenile Court Act in
1. "Parental rights encompass: the right to establish a home and bring up the child;the right to the care, custody, society and association of the child; the rights arise by
natural law; they are not property rights." Dobson, The Juvenile Court and Parental
Rights, 4 FAM. L.Q. 393, 395 (1970)(footnotes omitted). See Note, The Parens Patriae
Theory and Its Effect on the Constitutional Limits of Juvenile Court Powers, 27 U. Prrr.
L. Rav. 894, 905 (1966).
2. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). In Meyer, the Court determined that oneaspect of the guarantee of liberty in the fourteenth amendment is the right to raisechildren. Id. at 399. The Court upheld the parents' right to determine the kind of educa-tion their children would receive in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). InStanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), the Court reiterated that "[tihe rights to conceive
and to raise one's children have been deemed 'essential.' . . . The integrity of the familyunit has found protection in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
... "Id. at 651 (footnotes omitted). The Court reemphasized its holding that the defini-
tion of liberty, as protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment,includes freedom of choice in bearing and raising children in Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
3. The state intervenes in the family under the doctrine of parens patriae, whichviews every child's welfare as the concern of the state. See Dobson, supra note 1, at 396;
Kleinfeld, The Balance of Power Among Infants, Their Parents and The State, 5 FAM.L.Q. 63, 66 (1971); Note, Parens Patriae and Statutory Vagueness in the Juvenile Court,
82 YALE L.J. 745, 748 (1973).
4. The Washington statute provides a variety of grounds upon which a court maydeclare an individual under the age of eighteen dependent. These grounds include situa-tions where a child is abandoned, abused, neglected, in conflict with his or her parent or
guardian, in danger of degenerating into serious delinquent behavior, or in need of treat-ment. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.030 (Supp. 1977). For a discussion of the Washington
dependency statute prior to July 1, 1978, see Comment, Procedural and Substantive
Rights of Parents in Child Dependency Hearings, 12 GONZ. L. RED. 505, 515 (1977).
5. See In re Sego, 82 Wash. 2d 736, 513 P.2d 831 (1973).
6. In Washington, the state can also place the child in a group home or other institu-
tional care, but generally cannot place a nondelinquent in a secured detention facility.
See WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.140 (Supp. 1977).
7. See text accompanying notes 20-43 supra.
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Cases Relating to Dependency of A Child and the Termination
of a Parent and Child Relationship 8 represents a legislative at-
tempt to nurture the family unit by severely limiting trial court
discretion. The new law provides standards making judicial ter-
mination of parental rights difficult in all cases.' The Institute of
Judicial Administration and the American Bar Association also
have jointly proposed standards limiting trial court discretion in
termination proceedings. 10 The ABA proposal, however, differs
markedly from the Washington legislation. Attempting to limit
the duration of foster care placements, the ABA would require the
trial judge to order termination in many cases of extended foster
care." This comment contrasts the system of broad discretion
under the previous Washington law with the two very different
systems of limited discretion embodied in the Juvenile Court Act
and the ABA proposal.
Although acknowledging the need for more research concern-
ing the effects of foster care,"2 commentators generally agree that
removal, even from a bad family environment, creates severe
problems for the child.' 3 Court ordered removal disrupts the
parent-child relationship and may cause psychological damage
more serious than the harm intervention is intended to prevent.'4
Long term foster care compounds these problems. Even if the
child stays in one foster home, the uncertain nature of the place-
ment," and the possibility the child will view the placement as
8. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 13.34.010-.210 (Supp. 1977). Prior to the 1977 act, the Wash-
ington courts referred to termination as "permanent deprivation" of parental rights. In
re Sego, 82 Wash. 2d 736, 738, 513 P.2d 831, 832-33 (1973). This comment uses the term
"termination" to conform with the new statute's terminology. The Juvenile Court Act
became effective in Washington on July 1, 1978. The Washington Legislature allowed
almost a full year following enactment of the statute before it went into effect. This
allowed juvenile courts and child welfare agencies time to prepare for the many changes
mandated by the new law.
9. See text accompanying notes 72-103 supra.
10. JOINT COMMISSION ON JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS, INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINIS-
TRATION & AMERcAN BAR ASSOCIA ION, JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS PROJECT-STANDARDS
RELATING TO ABUSE AND NEGLECT (1977) [hereinafter cited as STANDARDS].
11. Id. at 154-61.
12. See, e.g., Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: Standards
for Removal of Children from Their Homes, Monitoring the Status of Children in Foster
Care, and Termination of Parental Rights, 28 STAN. L. REv. 623, 643-44 (1976)(this article
and the article cited at note 13 supra include material developed by Professor Wald for
the ABA's Juvenile Justice Standards Project).
13. See, e.g., Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: A Search
for Realistic Standards, 27 STAN. L. REV. 985, 994 (1975).
14. Id.
15. Foster care placements are uncertain because, although they are designed to be
short-term arrangements, in actual practice they may continue for years. See Comment,
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punishment, may create further emotional difficulty for the
child.'" Generally, however, the longer a child remains in foster
care, the greater the chance of multiple foster placements." Every
new placement involves another separation experience and an-
other adjustment into a new home environment, and tends to
multiply the child's psychological difficulties.'8 Multiple place-
ments may cause the child to feel rejected, and destroy continuity
needed for stable emotional development.'
Statutory termination guidelines did not exist in Washington
prior to the Juvenile Court Act.' Although the previous statute
did not expressly mention termination, the Washington Supreme
Court held that superior courts could terminate parental rights
when the trial judge found dependency under the previous stat-
ute,' and found substantial evidence indicating termination
would enhance the child's welfare. The court admitted that cri-
teria establishing the child's best interest were "conspicuous by
their absence" from case law,2 but refused to enunciate stan-
dards because mandatory consideration of specified factors might
prevent the careful individual treatment needed in complex ter-
mination cases.2 The Washington Supreme Court, therefore, al-
lowed trial courts broad discretion to weigh the interests of family
and child on a case by case basis.
The supreme court provided few guidelines to aid trial courts
in weighing these interests. Although defining the parents' inter-
est as a "sacred right,"2' the court stated that where the rights of
parent and child conflicted, the child's interest must prevail.2 By
The Foster Parents Dilemma: "Who Can I Turn to When Somebody Needs Me?", 11 SAN
DiEGo L. REv. 376, 390 (1974).
16. See Wald, supra note 13, at 995. The uncertain length of foster placements also
creates difficulties for foster parents who must try to provide normal affection and care
for the child while avoiding emotional attachments. Katz, Legal Aspects of Foster Care,
5 FAM. L.Q. 283, 301 (1971).
17. See Fanshel, Status Changes of Children in Foster Care: Final Results of the
Columbia University Longitudinal Study, 55 CHiD Wm ymw 143 (1976); Maas, Children
in Long-Term Foster Care, 48 CHILD WEuARE 321 (1969).
18. N. LrrrNsl, SOME TRAuMATIc EFmcrs OF SEPARATION AND PLAcEMENT 22 (1973).
19. Wald, supra note 12, at 645-48.
20. The prior law expressed a definite preference for the natural parents in custody
matters, and prohibited the court from removing the child from the home unless the
welfare of the child so required, but the statute did not provide standards to terminate
parental rights. See Juvenile Court Law, ch. 160, § 14, 1913 Wash. Laws 520 (repealed
1977)(repeal effective July 1, 1978).
21. In re Sego, 82 Wash. 2d 736, 513 P.2d 831 (1973). For a discussion of the previous
statute, see Comment, supra note 4, at 515.
22. In re Becker, 87 Wash. 2d 470, 477, 553 P.2d 1339, 1341 (1975).
23. Id. at 478, 553 P.2d at 1341.
24. Moore v. Burdman, 84 Wash. 2d 408, 411, 526 P.2d 893, 895 (1974).
25. Child welfare prevailed in In re Sego, 82 Wash. 2d 736, 513 P.2d 831 (1973), where
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excluding consideration of such factors as the quality of education
or living environment provided the child,26 the court indicated
that although trial courts could act to protect children, they could
not rearrange families solely to place children with those per-
ceived best able to rear them." The supreme court sought, how-
ever, to allow the trial judge ample flexibility to reach a decision
that recognized both the child's welfare and the parents' rights.28
Furthermore, the supreme court placed very strong reliance on a
trial court termination decision.2
Although prior Washington law granted trial judges broad
discretion in deciding whether to terminate parental rights, proof
requirements and procedural rules helped to safeguard the rights
of natural parents?' After articulating several formulations of the
proof required,3 the Washington Supreme Court held that only
substantial evidence-"clear, cogent, and convincing proof'3 2
-would support a termination order. The supreme court also
held that parents are entitled to notice of the issues in the hearing
and to notice the hearing might result in termination.3 The court
also required the state to provide appointed counsel to indigent
parents.34 Unlike jurisdictions that admit hearsay evidence in ter-
the supreme court affirmed a termination order despite Justice Finley's strong dissent.
Although the father was in the penitentiary for murdering the child's mother, the trial
court found that he had made remarkable rehabilitative progress. Despite this progress
and his possibility of parole and desire to reunite with the child, the supreme court upheld
the termination order because it was in the child's best interest.
26. In re Day, 189 Wash. 368, 384, 65 P.2d 1049, 1056 (1937).
27. See In re Warren, 40 Wash. 2d 342, 343, 243 P.2d 632, 633 (1952). See also Lovell
v. House of the Good Shepherd, 9 Wash. 419, 37 P. 660 (1894); In re May, 14 Wash. App.
765, 545 P.2d 25 (1976).
28. In re Becker, 87 Wash. 2d 470, 478, 553 P.2d 1339, 1343 (1976).
29. The court in In re Schulz, 17 Wash. App. 134, 140, 561 P.2d 1122, 1126 (1977),
said that "particularly . . .in child deprivation [termination] cases" the appellate court
cannot substitute their findings for that of the trial court.
30. See Katz, Judicial and Statutory Trends in the Law of Adoption, 51 GEO. L.J.
64, 69 (1962).
31. "We have also referred to the proof necessary for permanent deprivation as that
supported by 'the most powerful reasons,' 'imperatively demanded,' and, a 'plain show-
ing."' In re Sego, 82 Wash. 2d 736, 738, 513 P.2d 831, 832 (1973) (citations omitted).
32. Id.
33. In re Martin, 3 Wash. App. 405, 476 P.2d 134 (1970).
34. In re Luscier, 84 Wash. 2d 135, 524 P.2d 906 (1974). The case is discussed in
Comment, supra note 4, at 507-08. Justices Black and Douglas dissented from a denial ofcertiorari where an indigent mother was denied court appointed counsel to defend herself
against a state action to take custody of her children. Justice Black stated that:
Here the State is employing the judicial mechanism it has created to enforce
society's will upon an individual and take away her children. The case by its
very nature resembles a criminal prosecution. The defendant is charged with
conduct-failure to care properly for her children-which may be criminal and
which in any event is viewed as reprehensible and morally wrong by a majority
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mination proceedings to insure all relevant factors are presented
to the court,35 the Washington Supreme Court excluded the use
of hearsay. 36 Excluding hearsay indicated the court viewed termi-
nation as a formal adversary proceeding 37 and insured parents the
opportunity to cross-examine social workers and psychologists
upon whom the state frequently relied to prove the necessity of a
termination order.3 8
Broad judicial discretion allowed trial judges to choose the
factors they would focus on when making termination decisions. 9
Such flexibility allowed a judge to make termination orders either
difficult to obtain, thereby permitting extended foster place-
ments, or easy to obtain, thereby promoting early termination
and permanent child placement. 0 Critics attacked such broad
discretion on two related grounds: (1) it allowed judges to decide
of society. And the cost of being unsuccessful is dearly high-loss of the compan-
ionship of one's children.
Meltzer v. Buck LeCran & Co., 402 U.S. 954, 959 (1971) (Justice Black was protesting the
denial of certiorari in Kaufman v. Carter, 402 U.S. 964 (1971).).
35. See Note, Proceedings to Terminate Parental Rights: Too Much or Too Little
Protection for Parents?, 16 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 337, 349-52 (1976).
36. In re Ross, 45 Wash. 2d 654, 277 P.2d 335 (1954).
37. See Katz, supra note 30, at 69.
38. See Note, In the Child's Best Interests: Rights of the Natural Parents in Child
Placement Proceedings, 51 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 446, 467-68 (1976). Another factor that favors
parents under the prior and current law is the court's power of modification. WASH. REv.
CODE § 13.34.150 (Supp. 1977). See In re Boatman, 73 Wash. 2d 364, 438 P.2d 600 (1968);
McClain v. Superior Court, 112 Wash. 260, 190 P. 852 (1920). If the court chooses to retain
jurisdiction over the child, it can modify a termination order even after awarding perma-
nent custody to another party. A juvenile court has argued that the power of modification
gives parents an adequate post-judgment remedy and thus precludes the necessity of
appellate review. In re Miller, 40 Wash. 2d 319, 242 P.2d 1016 (1952). The supreme court
rejected this argument, stating that certiorari is available to review all orders of the
juvenile court. Certiorari did not depend on any power of modification in the juvenile
court. Id. at 321, 242 P.2d at 1017.
39. Many Washington cases cite parental behavior to support termination orders. In
re Sego, 82 Wash. 2d 736, 513 P.2d 831 (1973) (alcoholism, including cases where the
parent is a recovering alcoholic); In re Russell, 70 Wash. 2d 451, 423 P.2d 640 (1967)
(refusal of psychiatric treatment); In re Hauser, 15 Wash. App. 231, 548 P.2d 333 (1976)
(mental disorder); In re Gillespie, 14 Wash. App. 512, 543 P.2d 249 (1975)(criminal activ-
ity); In re Price, 13 Wash. App. 437, 535 P.2d 475 (1975) (resisting help from the state,
failure to administer needed medication to the child, low intellect, bad judgment, poverty,
and distrust of public officials). Other factors Washington courts relied upon in deciding
termination cases included whether the parental lifestyle improved between the time the
child was removed and the termination hearing, In re Three Minors, 50 Wash. 2d 653, 314
P.2d 423 (1957); whether the parent was ever given the opportunity to care for the child,
In re May, 14 Wash. App. 765, 545 P.2d 25 (1976); and whether the parent produced a
definite and realistic plan to care for the child, In re Gillespie, 14 Wash. App. 512, 543
P.2d 249 (1975).
40. See STANDARDS, supra note 10, at 120-22; Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication:
Judicial Functions In the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 226, 249-60
(Summer 1975).
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cases primarily on personal bias toward maintenance of the
natural family unit;" (2) it contributed to the system of long-term
foster care4" because judges were reluctant to order termination
unless the state proved intentional parental fault."
The American Bar Association's Juvenile Justice Standards
Project proposed a termination system narrowing judicial discre-
tion and limiting both the number and length of foster place-
ments. The standards limit the number of initial foster place-
ments by removing children from their natural home only when
serious harm to the child is imminent," thus avoiding the trauma
of removal in all but the most extreme cases of potential harm to
the child."5 Once the court removes a child from the home, the
Juvenile Justice Standards recommend that:
in general, a child either should be returned home or freed for
adoption or other permanent placement within a year of the
time he/she enters foster care. The preferred disposition is to
return a child to his/her natural parents . . . However, in a
number of cases, perhaps even the majority of cases, if children
are removed only as a last resort, return will not be possible. In
such cases termination of parental rights may be essential in
order to provide a child with a permanent home.'"
The ABA proposal seeks to end long term foster placements
by facilitating early return to the parents if return is possible, and
early termination if return is not possible. If return is impossible,
the proposal requires termination after an established length of
time unless the case falls within certain exceptions. 7 For children
41. Wald, supra note 12, at 688; Note, supra note 38, at 463-64.
42. Wald, supra note 12, at 693.
43. See STANDARDS, supra note 10, at 148-49. Opponents of broad discretion also
attack several termination statutes as unconstitutionally vague, alleging the statutes vio-
late the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment by permitting arbitrary termina-
tions and by failing to warn parents of the conduct proscribed. See Alsager v. District
Court, 406 F. Supp. 10 (S.D. Iowa 1975); In re Cager, 251 Md. 473, 248 A.2d 384 (1968);
State v. McMaster, 259 Or. 291, 486 P.2d 567 (1971); Levine, Foundations for Drafting a
Model Statute to Terminate Parental Rights: A Select Bibliography, 26 Juv. JUST. 42, 43
n.2 (1975).
44. STANDARDS, supra note 10, at 39-40, 42-43.
45. Id. at 40-44.
46. Id. at 149.
47. The ABA proposes exceptions to the termination requirement where the court
finds by clear and convincing evidence:
A. because of the closeness of the parent-child relationship, it would be detri-
mental to the child to terminate parental rights; B. the child is placed with a
relative who does not wish to adopt the child; C. because of the nature of the
child's problems, the child is placed in a residential treatment facility, and
continuation of parental rights will not prevent finding the child a permanent
family placement if the parents cannot resume custody when residential care is
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under three, the proposal requires termination if the court cannot
return children to their natural home after a six month place-
ment.' 8 For children over three, the proposal requires termination
after placement for a year.' 9 In establishing this different treat-
ment based on the age of the child, the proposal relies on re-
search 0 indicating that extended foster placements are more
damaging to children under three."
Like the ABA proposal, the Juvenile Court Act removes chil-
dren from their natural homes only in circumstances of extreme
risk to the child.5" The Washington Legislature relied, at least in
part, on the Juvenile Justice Standards in authorizing removal
only when children are seriously endangered. 53 Limiting state in-
tervention in the home conforms with the legislative intent ex-
pressed in the Juvenile Court Act to preserve the natural family
unit unless compelling evidence requires removal. 5'
The Juvenile Court Act limits intervention through provis-
ions carefully restricting the state's ability to remove children
from their homes. The Act forbids the state to hold a child longer
than seventy-two hours in the absence of a court order for contin-
ued shelter care.55 The parents have a right to a preliminary shel-
ter care hearing, and the court must release the child at the
hearing unless release would present a serious threat of substan-
no longer needed; D. the child cannot be placed permanently in a family envi-
ronment and failure to terminate will not impair the child's opportunity for a
permanent placement in a family setting; E. a child over ten objects to termina-
tion.
Id. at 157-58.
48. Id. at 154.
49. Id.
50. A correlation exists between the age of the child and the damage caused by
multiple foster placements. Separation from the home, followed by separation from the
new foster home, creates even greater psychological difficulties for children under three
than for older children. N. LrrrNER, supra note 18, at 20. Research indicates children under
three cannot retain an attachment to absent parents longer than six months, but older
children can better retain these emotional ties. See STANDARDS, supra note 10, at 156-57.
Psychiatrists also believe that children under three have even greater need for stable,
permanent homes than older children. See Note, Psychological v. Biological Parenthood
in Determining the Best Interests of the Child, 3 SETON HALL L. Rav. 130, 137-38 (1972).
51. STANDARDS, supra note 10, at i48-49.
52. See text accompanying notes 55-71 supra.
53. Several statutory provisions adopt the language proposed by the ABA verbatim.
Compare WASH. REv. CODE § 13.34.130(2)(a)-(c) with STANDARDS, supra note 10, at 28 (§
6.5B 1-3).
54. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.020 (Supp. 1977).
55. The Act defines "shelter care" as a foster family home or licensed receiving home
but specifically excludes the use of a secured detention facility to house an abused or
neglected child. Id. § 13.34.060.
19781
162 University of Puget Sound Law Review
tial harm to the child. 5 Construed in light of the legislative intent
expressed in the statute, the "substantial harm" test prevents the
removal of children for longer than seventy-two hours except in
the most extreme circumstances. Although this approach does
not protect children from all harm, it recognizes the state's inabil-
ity to intervene in every situation of possible child harm,57 and
generally promotes child welfare by limiting the initial separation
experience and the number of foster placements.
The Act requires the court to hold a factfinding hearing to
determine whether a child is dependent.58 Even if the court finds
dependency, the Act carefully restricts the circumstances under
which a court can place the child outside the natural home. 5' To
aid the court in ordering a disposition of the child, the new law
requires the Department of Social and Health Services0 to sub-
mit a written social study." If the parents allegedly abused or
neglected the child, DSHS also must submit a predisposition
study" containing six specific findings: (1) the danger the agency
seeks to alleviate by intervention; (2) the specific services the
agency will provide parent and child; (3) reasons why the child
cannot be adequately protected in the home; (4) likely harm to
the child from removal; (5) how the agency will minimize that
harm; and (6) parental behavior expected before the placement
will end.63 Not only do these provisions substantively allow re-
moval only in limited situations, the administrative burden in-
volved in making these findings could create institutional pres-
sure within the agency to remove children only infrequently from
the home.
When a court considers the disposition of a dependent child,
the statute not only requires DSHS to submit the written studies
discussed above, it also carefully restricts the court's power to
order a disposition removing the child from the home. The court
must return the child to its natural parents unless (1) no parent
or guardian will accept custody, or (2) the child is unwilling to
return, or (3) there is a "manifest danger""4 the child would suffer
further abuse or neglect in the home. 5 Thus, the court must find
56. Id. § 13.34.060(6)(b).
57. See Wald, supra note 13, at 987.
58. WASH. REv. CODE § 13.34.110 (Supp. 1977).
59. Id. § 13.34.130.
60. The Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS) is the Washington state
agency empowered to deal with child welfare.
61. WASH. REv. CODE § 13.34.120(1) (Supp. 1977).
62. Id. § 13.34.120(2)(a)-(f).
63. Id.
64. Id. § 13.34.130(1)(b)(iv).
65. Id.
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both dependency and a manifest danger of harm before placing
the child in foster care against the wishes of parent and child.
These requirements further limit the courts' power to place the
child in foster care, and help to ensure removal only in situations
of grave potential harm to the child.
If the court does order a disposition placing the dependent
child outside the natural home, the statute requires DSHS to
submit a further plan stating where the agency will place the
child, what steps the agency will take to return the child home,
and what action the agency will take to maintain parent-child
ties.6 The plan must specify the agency services the parent will
receive, encourage maximum parent-child contact, and provide
for the child's placement as close to home as possible. 7 The Act
also requires the court to review the child's status in foster care
every six months 8 and to return the child home at the time of
review unless the "manifest danger"" of abuse or neglect still
exists. If the court does not return the child home, it must estab-
lish in writing several factors detailing why return is impossible
and when return is expected.70 Both the ABA proposal and the
Juvenile Court Act require the agency to plan and work toward
returning children to their natural parents and the court to order
the child's return unless it continues to find a manifest danger of
potential harm in the home environment. These return provisions
both ensure continuing court review of foster care placements,
and promote child welfare in situations where the home environ-
ment improves and the child returns to the parents within six
months to a year.7
Although the Juvenile Court Act follows the ABA approach
concerning the child's removal and early return, the two take very
dissimilar positions regarding termination of parental rights.
Rather than adopting the ABA approach of facilitating termina-
tion when return is impossible, the Act makes termination ex-
tremely difficult to obtain. The new law establishes seven specific
elements an individual or agency 7" must prove by substantial
66. Id. § 13.34.130(2).
67. Id. § 13.34.130(2)(c).
68. Id. § 13.34.130(3).
69. Id. § 13.34.130(1)(b)(iv), (3)(a).
70. Id. § 13.34.130(3)(b).
71. The damaging effects of foster care increase signficantly after six months to a year
depending on the age of the child. See note 50 supra.
72. A petition seeking termination of parental rights must conform to WASH. REv.
CODE § 13.34.040 (Supp. 1977), which provides that any person may file a petition with
the clerk of the superior court showing that there is a delinquent or dependent child within
the county. Thus, individuals, as well as state agencies, may seek termination of parental
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evidence before a court may terminate parental rights. The Act
also requires the court to find termination "in the best interests
of the child. ' 73 These seven elements and the best interest test are
new statutory prerequisites for termination that place a tremen-
dous burden of proof on the state before it can obtain any termi-
nation of parental rights.
The first element requires the court to declare the child de-
pendent and remove him from parental custody for a minimum
of six months prior to the termination hearing.74 This element
precludes the trial court from acting precipitously and guarantees
parents an opportunity to demonstrate their fitness to care for the
child.75 Although the legislature generally agrees with modem
sociological data in selecting six months and not a longer waiting
period,76 some commentators suggest that in cases where parental
rehabilitation appears hopeless, the court should order termina-
tion immediately to avoid unnecessary short-term placement of
the child. 77
To satisfy the second termination element the moving party
must prove the conditions leading to the removal still persist.
7 1 If
parents rectify the conditions that caused the court to remove the
child, a court could not grant a termination order despite severe
new problems in the home environment. Thus, the Act suggests
that where home problems change but remain adverse to the
child, a subsequent "removal" of the child under the new adverse
home conditions and another six month waiting period" is neces-
sary before the court can sever the parental rights. This provision
guarantees parents at least six months to rectify any adverse
home conditions identified by the agency, but may needlessly
delay termination where the child's return is hopeless.
rights. The Act also provides that the court may, at a hearing to review the status of a
dependent child, order that a petition seeking termination of parental rights be filed. Id.
§ 13.34.130(3)(d).
73. Id. § 13.34.190(2).
74. Id. § 13.34.180(1).
75. The court overturned a termination order where the agency removed the child
from the mother at birth, and the trial court ordered termination four months later. In re
May, 14 Wash. App. 765, 545 P.2d 25 (1976).
76. See Gordon, Terminal Placements of Children and Permanent Termination of
Parental Rights: The New York Permanent Neglect Statute, 46 ST. JOHNS L. REv. 215,
232 (1971). Critics maintain that two-year waiting periods are too long, because within
six months foster parents are likely to become the "psychological parents" of an infant in
their care. Longer waiting periods also reduce the chance for a permanent placement,
particularly where the child is under three. See, e.g., Wald, supra note 12, at 689-90.
77. See, e.g., STANDARDS, supra note 10, at 151-52. See also Mnookin, supra note 40,
at 261.
78. WASH. Rav. CODE § 13.34.180(2) (Supp. 1977).
79. Id. § 13.34.180(1).
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The third termination element requires the trial court to not
only examine the parents' past behavior, but also find "little
likelihood that those conditions [which led to the removal] will
be remedied so that the child can be returned to the parent in the
near future."' 0 This language is sufficiently broad to allow the
trial judge some leeway in determining when termination is
proper. In construing whether there is "little likelihood" of return
"in the near future," the judge could consider the age of the child
as an important variable in determining the urgency of a termina-
tion order. As recognized in the ABA standards," an infant's need
for a stable, permanent home is greater than that of a child over
three. This greater need might lead a trial judge to recognize that
the "near future" is a shorter length of time for a child under
three, thus facilitating permanent placement of infants.
Not only must parents be progressing so slowly that return
in the near future is impossible, the fourth termination element
requires the court to find the parent-child relationship "clearly
diminishes the child's prospects for early integration into a stable
and permanent home."82 If no adoptive home is currently avail-
able, the court might find the parental relationship did not"clearly diminish" the child's opportunity for permanent place-
ment. This construction is reasonable because the parents' con-
tinuing interest does not damage the child if it does not obstruct
a permanent placement. A subsequent termination hearing
would be necessary, however, if an adoptive home later becomes
available.
Imposing upon the state an affirmative duty to try to re-
establish the parent-child relationship, the fifth termination ele-
ment commands the agency to provide or offer "necessary serv-
ices '83 to the parent to facilitate a reunion. Parental failure of any
type or degree will not justify termination unless the agency offers
these services.84 The agency plan required by the Act whenever
the court orders a dependent child placed outside the home"
includes the opportunity for regular parent-child visits. This re-
quirement 6 adopts the ABA standard nearly verbatim, but de-
letes the following language: "unless the court finds that visita-
80. Id. § 13.34.180(3), (4).
81. STANDARDS, supra note 10, at 154.
82. WASH. REv. CODE § 13.34.180(4) (Supp. 1977).
83. Id. § 13.34.180(5). See Gordon, supra note 76, at 237-38; Levine, supra note 43,
at 45 (the author advocates a "right to treatment" philosophy in termination statutes).
84. See Gordon, supra note 76, at 237-38.
85. See text accompanying notes 66-67 supra.
86. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.130(2)(b) (Supp. 1977).
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tion should be limited because it will be seriously detrimental to
the child."87 The Juvenile Court Act substitutes an inflexible
parental visitation requirement, allowing the agency no choice
other than to proceed with parental visits even if they damage
the child.8 8 If Washington courts accept this provision as indicat-
ing parent-child visits are part of the "necessary services" that
must be provided the parent prior to termination, they will place
the agency in a very difficult position where parental visits dam-
age the child. For example, In re Hauser,9 decided prior to the
1977 Act, affirmed a termination order where the agency limited
parental visits because the emotionally disturbed parents fright-
ened the child. 0 The Juvenile Court Act might force the agency
in a Hauser situation to choose between allowing parental visits
detrimental to the child, or making termination impossible by
failing to provide services."'
The requirement of providing parental services also may cre-
ate difficulties if the agency stops trying to facilitate a reunion
and starts planning for termination and adoption. If the agency
believes return is hopeless, the statute requires the agency to seek
termination rather than encourage voluntary adoption. In In re
Clear,2 a New York agency reasonably decided to encourage the
mother to allow voluntary adoption. 3 The family court, however,
found the agency had not met the statutory requirement of dili-
gent efforts to strengthen the parent-child relationship. Washing-
ton's similar requirement94 might mean that if the agency encour-
aged the parents to allow adoption, the agency could not later
obtain termination. The agency could not easily argue it is pro-
viding services to facilitate a reunion when, in fact, it is encourag-
ing the parents to give up their legal rights in the child.
The sixth termination element requires a finding that "the
87. STANDARDS, supra note 10, at 130.
88. "The agency shall be required to encourage the maximum parent-child contact
possible, including regular visitation and participation by the parents in the care of the
child while the child is in placement." WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.130(2)(b) (Supp. 1977).
89. 15 Wash. App. 231, 548 P.2d 333 (1976).
90. Id. at 236, 548 P.2d at 337.
91. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.180(5) (Supp. 1977).
92. 58 Misc. 2d 699, 296 N.Y.S. 2d 184 (Fam. Ct.), rev'd and remanded sub nom, In
re Klug, 32 App. Div. 2d 915, 302 N.Y.S. 2d 418 (1969), on remand, 65 Misc. 2d 323, 318
N.Y.S. 2d 876 (Fam. Ct. 1970). The opinion reversing the Family Court added little
analytically, but did broaden the Act's construction by stating that the lower court placed
too much weight on the statutory requirement to encourage the parental relationship.
Given this broadened construction, on remand the Family Court terminated the parental
rights.
93. 58 Misc. 2d 699, 708, 296 N.Y.S. 2d 184, 192 (Fain. Ct. 1969).
94. WASH. REv. CODE § 13.34.180(5) (Supp. 1977).
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parent has substantially failed to accept such services."" To a
degree, this provision takes the termination decision from the
judge and places it with the parents. By accepting services, par-
ents can prevent termination regardless of the circumstances.
This requirement appears to go beyond the statement of legisla-
tive intent in the Juvenile Court Act" because it may deny termi-
nation even when compelling evidence demonstrates the family
cannot remain intact. The court may be unable to terminate the
parent-child relationship regardless of extreme problems in the
home that make return impossible. The sixth requirement disre-
gards the likelihood of return and diminishes the child's prospect
of integrating into a new permanent home.
Courts should construe the sixth element so as to prevent
parents from delaying termination by accepting agency services
in bad faith. Parents may argue that the legislative purpose is to
hold the family intact, and thus the court should maintain paren-
tal rights without regard to the parents' motivation in accepting
services. Although the statute does not mention good faith, a
court rationally could hold that where parents do not cooperate
in good faith, they "substantially"97 fail to accept agency services.
This construction requires the agency to prove by substantial
evidence the parents' motivation in accepting services. This
would be particularly difficult, however, because proof of a moti-
vation to block termination tends to show a genuine parental
desire to reunite with the child, which may support the position
that acceptance was indeed in good faith. In response, the agency
could argue the parents were motivated not by a desire to foster
a reunion with the child, but rather by a desire to resist the state,
and assert control and dominion over the child. Despite eviden-
tiary problems, however, courts should construe the statute to
deny parents the ability to prevent termination when they fail to
cooperate with agency services in good faith. This construction
promotes child welfare by increasing the court's power to order
termination when there is little likelihood a child in long-term
foster care can ever be returned home.
The seventh termination element permits the court to order
termination only if the parents have substantially failed to com-
ply with any order of disposition pursuant to the finding of de-
pendency. 8 This provision enables parents subject to a disposi-
95. Id. § 13.34.180(6).
96. Id. § 13.34.020.
97. Id. § 13.34.180(6).
98. Id. § 13.34.180(7).
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tion order to prevent termination by complying with that order.
If a court deems a disposition order necessary, it must draw the
order so parental compliance realistically ensures a home situa-
tion to which the court can return the child. If not, the parents
will be able to prevent termination by compliance with the order,
yet the child may remain in extended foster care because the
court is unable to sever the parents' rights or return the child
home.
Finally, the Juvenile Court Act requires termination orders
to be in the "best interests of the child."" Some statutory
schemes employ this test as virtually the sole criterion for termi-
nation.10 One commentator describes the use of the best inter-
ests test in these systems as a "mandate from the legislature,
directing the judge to use his discretion in making a disposi-
tion."'10  The Juvenile Court Act narrows this discretion through
the seven requirements described above, which require a court
to focus on certain factors in deciding whether to terminate pa-
rental rights. The best interests test in the Washington scheme,
however, does provide another ground upon which a court may
deny termination, because notwithstanding the statute's seven
termination elements, a court may still deny termination on the
ground it is not in the child's "best interests."
The seven requirements for termination in the Juvenile
Court Act embody a completely different approach to termina-
tion than do the ABA standards. The ABA proposal requires
termination of parental rights after six months or a year unless
the court finds by clear and cogent evidence that one of five
exceptions is applicable. 02 The Washington statute disallows ter-
mination in all cases unless the agency proves the seven elements
by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence 10 3 and the court finds
the child's best interests require termination. The ABA proposal
consistently seeks to reduce the number and length of foster
placements by limiting state intervention to cases of imminent
serious harm to the child, and then by requiring termination if
home conditions do not permit return. Although Washington sim-
99. Id. § 13.34.190(2).
100. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46-42 (1975); MONT. REV. CODE § 10-1314(3), (5)
(Supp. 1977).
101. Katz, Foster Parents Versus Agencies: A Case Study in the Judicial Application
of "The Best Interests of the Child" Doctrine, 65 MICH. L. REV. 145, 153 (1966). Michigan
narrows this discretion by statutorily defining the child's best interest. MICH. COMP. LAws
§ 722.23 (1978).
102. STANDARDS, supra note 10, at 157-58.
103. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.190 (Supp. 1977).
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ilarly limits state intervention, the new law perpetuates lengthy
foster placements by making termination extremely difficult to
obtain.
The Juvenile Court Act provides needed standards for termi-
nating parental rights but restricts too severely a court's power
to sever the parent-child relationship. The statute facilitates the
child's early return home and, in situations where return is possi-
ble, promotes child welfare. If the home environment seriously
endangers the child, however, and the parents refuse to allow
adoption, the Washington law severely restricts the court's ability
to place the child in a permanent home. By allowing removal only
when a child faces imminent danger of serious harm, mandating
agency efforts to maintain the parent-child relationship, provid-
ing procedural protections for parents, and requiring a high
standard of proof, the Act represents a potent statutory scheme
to preserve the family unit. The Act, however, also perpetuates
the damaging system of long-term foster care by making termina-
tion difficult, if not impossible, even where families are experi-
encing hopeless conflict.04
At a minimum, the legislature should change the Washing-
ton law by deleting the last three termination requirements,0 5
and by modifying the parental visitation requirement to conform
to the language of the ABA proposal. 06 This revision would at
least expand the trial court's power to order termination where
there is little chance of return. The legislature could better im-
prove the statute, however, by consistently following the ABA
termination proposal, which better protects the interests of both
family and child. Not only does the ABA approach keep families
intact by removing children only as a last resort, it also protects
those children ultimately removed by ensuring they are not de-
nied a permanent adoptive home because of a remaining legal
relationship with their natural parents.
Sandy D. McDade
104. Commentators recognize that in certain situations the decision to terminate is
relatively "easy" because of serious and insoluble problems in the home environment."While there is no consensus about what is best for a child, there is much consensus about
what is very bad (e.g., physical abuse); some short-term predictions about human behav-
ior can be reliably made (e.g., chronic alcoholism or psychosis is difficult quickly to
modify)." Mnookin, supra note 40, at 261.
105. WASH. Rav. CODE § 13.34.180(5)(7) (Supp. 1977).
106. STANDARDS, supra note 10, at 130.
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